



Northeastern University

Systems Security Lab



Android DDI: Introduction to Dynamic Dalvik Instrumentation

Hack in the Box
Kuala Lumpur, Oct. 2013


[Collin Mulliner](#)
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NEU SECLAB

\$ finger collin@mulliner.org

- 'postdoc' Security Researcher
 - \$HOME = Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
 - cat .project
 - specialized in *mobile handset security*
- Current work
 - Android security
- Past work
 - Bluetooth security
 - A lot on SMS and MMS security
 - Mobile web usage and privacy
 - Some early work on NFC phone security

Android Hackers Handbook



ETA: April 2014

NEU SECLAB

Collin Mulliner - "Introduction to Dynamic Dalvik Instrumentation" - HITB KUL 2013

Introduction

- Android Application Security
 - Find vulnerabilities (audit)
 - Analyze malware
 - RE ... what is this application doing
 - ATTACK stuff
- What does this thing do? How does this thing work?
 - Disassemble → look at smali code
 - Run in emulator/sandbox → look at traces / network
 - (Static) instrumentation → look at app while it runs

Introduction

- Android Application Security
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- What does this thing do? How does this thing work?
 - Disassemble → look at smali code
 - Run in emulator/sandbox → look at traces / network
 - (Static) instrumentation → look at app while it runs
- **This talk is about Dynamic Instrumentation**
 - **Instrumentation at the Dalvik level**
(but not bytecode!)

Related Work

- Cydia Substrate for Android
 - Tailored towards building app extensions
 - Powerful but complex
 - <http://www.cydiasubstrate.com>
- Xposed framework
 - Designed for app & system mods
 - <http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=1574401>
- My DDI framework is small, easy to understand, easy to use and built for security work

Static Instrumentation on Android

- Unpack APK
 - Convert manifest back to plain text, ...
- Disassemble DEX classes
 - Get smali code
- Instrument smali code
 - Modify smali code, add own code
- Repackage application
 - Compile code, Sign, etc...
- Install and run
 - Hope it works... (bug in patch, self integrity check, ...)

Dynamic Instrumentation

- Change/modify application code at runtime
 - Allows to add and remove code/hooks on-the-fly
 - Technique has been around for many years
- Instrument library calls: quick overview what happens
 - No disassembly needed
- Still need to disassemble for target specific stuff
 - Find the interesting stuff to instrument

Dynamic Instrumentation on Android


- Not needed: unpacking, disassemble, modify, compile, repacking
 - Saves us time
- APK not modified
 - Defeat 'simple' integrity checks
- But Android Apps are written in Java and run in a VM...

Android



Android Runtime

- Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM)
Core Libraries (java.x.y)
 - Executes: Framework and Applications
- Application
 - Process for “MainActivity”
 - Additional process(s) for “Service”
- Framework works in the same way!
 - zygote
 - system_server
 - ...



Dalvik Instrumentation – The Basic Idea

- Convert Dalvik method to native (JNI) method
 - We get control of the execution

- Call original Dalvik method from native method
 - This creates an in-line hook of the Dalvik method

- Implement instrumentation code using JNI
 - Access to everything
 - (private, protected doesn't exist in the land of C)**

Java Native Interface (JNI) super quick intro


- C API to interact between the Java and C/native world
 - You can write any type of java code using JNI ;-)
- JNI function, signature: `result name(JNIEnv *env, ...)`
 - Callable from the Java world
- JNI is essential for our instrumentation!
 - Need to know this in order to do instrumentation!
(but not to understand the talk!)

```
FindClass()          // obtain class reference
NewObject()          // create a new class object
GetMethodId()        // get method
CallObjectMethod()  // call a method
...
```

Dalvik Instrumentation - Overview

- Inject 'shared object' (.so) into running process
 - Provides the native code
 - My talk: *Dynamic Binary Instrumentation on Android (SummerCon 2012)*
- Native code 'talks to the DVM'
 - Resolve symbols from DVM
 - Call DVM functions to:
 - Lookup classes and methods
 - Hook method
 - Call original method

Do stuff to DVM



Hooking a Dalvik Method 1/3

- Find loaded class
- Find method by name and signature
- Change method parameters
- Convert to JNI method

```
cls = dvmFindLoadedClass("Ljava/lang/String;");  
met = dvmFindVirtualMethodHierByDescriptor(cls, "compareTo",  
                                           "(Ljava/lang/String;)I");
```

*if direct method use: `dvmFindDirectMethodByDescriptor()`

Hooking a Dalvik Method 2/3

- Method parameters (interesting for our task)

```
insSize          // size of input parameters
outSize          // size of output
registersSize    // size of method bytecode
insns            // bytecode
JniArgInfo       // argument parsing info (JNI)
access flags     // public, protected, private, native :-)
```

- *insSize* and *registersSize* are set to a specific value (next slides)
- *outSize* = 0
- *insns* is saved for calling original function (next slides)
- *JniArgInfo* = 0x80000000 (→ parse method arguments)
- *access flags* = *access flags* | 0x0100 (make method native)

Hooking a Dalvik Method 3/3

- Convert to JNI method

```
int dalvik_func_hook(JNIEnv *env, jobject this, jobject str)
{
    ...
}

dvmUseJNIBridge(met, dalvik_func_hook);
```

- Every call to `java.lang.String.compareTo(String)` is now handled by `dalvik_func_hook()`

Method Parameter Manipulation : the details

- The DVM needs to know how *big* the method arguments are
 - insSize
 - We also set registersSize == insSize
- Argument size calculation
 - Every argument adds one (1) to the input size
 - J (a double) adds two (2)
 - For methods of object classes (non static classes) add one (1) for the instance (this)

```
java.lang.String.compareTo("Ljava/lang/String;)I  
insSize == 2
```

Calling the Original Method

- Lookup class + method (or used saved values from hooking)
- Revert method parameters (or used saved values)
- Call method → inspect result → hook method again

```
int dalvik_hook_func(JNIEnv *env, jobject this, jobject str)
{
    jvalue args[1];
    args[0].l = str;
    int res = (*env)->CallIntMethodA(env, this, meth, args);
    return res;
}
```

LibDalvikHook 1/2

- Easy to use Dalvik hooking library
 - Provides: hooking, unhooking, calling original method

```
struct dalvik_hook_t h;    // hook data, remembers stuff for you

// setup the hook
dalvik_hook_setup(
    &h,                    // hook data
    "Ljava/lang/String;", // class name
    "compareTo",         // method name
    "(Ljava/lang/String;)I", // method signature
    2, // insSize (need to calculate that in your head! LOL)
    hook_func_compareto // hook function
);

// place hook
dalvik_hook(&libdhook, &h);
```

LibDalvikHook 2/2

- Calling the original method

```
int hook_func(JNIEnv *env, ...)
{
    dalvik_prepare(
        &libdhook,    // library context
        &h,           // hook data
        env          // JNI environment
    );
    // use JNI API to call method
    args[0].l = x;
    CallXXMethod(env, obj, h.mid, args); // h.mid → method

    dalvik_postcall(&libdhook, &h);
}
```

- Unhook by simply only calling **dalvik_prepare()**

Injecting the Instrumentation Library 1/2

- hijack tool from my talk about native Android instrumentation
 - SummerCon 2012
- Steps:
 - Push library and DEX file to /data/local/tmp
 - Enable DEX loading (`chmod 777 /data/dalvik-cache/`)
 - `hijack -p PID -l /data/local/tmp/lib.so`
- Injects the library into running process
 - Works on any process, including system apps + services e.g. `zygote`, `system_server`, ... :-)

Injecting the Instrumentation Library 2/2

- We want to inject into processes before they are executed
 - All Dalvik processes are forked from zygote
- hijack zygote and inject when it specializes
 - Need to know the main class of target application




```
hijack -p zygotePID -l lib.so -s org.mulliner.collin.work
```

Hijack's newest Features

- Inject into zygote **-z**
- Inject into new DVM process by class name (combine with -z)
-s full.class.name
- Disable calling mprotect() before injecting, old Android versions
-m
- Debug level switch
-D <level>

Instrumentation Code Flow (v1)

Method in App (Java)



Hook (JNI function)



Original function (Java)

proxy

Monitor / Reverse Applications

- How does the application work?
 - Maybe App is obfuscated, strings are “encrypted”
- Instrument interesting methods to see what App does
 - String operations
 - Reflection
 - ...

```
String  java.lang.StringBuffer.toString()  
int     java.lang.String.compareTo(...)  
int     java.lang.String.compareToIgnoreCase(...)  
String  java.lang.StringBuilder.toString()  
  
Method  java.lang.Class.getMethod(...)
```

Attack “Stuff”

- Disable Signature Verification
 - Used for all kinds of things...
 - Patch to always “return true;”
(used it to attack various things)

```
boolean java.security.Signature.verify(byte[]) { ... }
```

Loading Additional Classes

- Sophisticated “instrumentation”
 - way easier done in Java than in C-JNI
 - You really want to be able to write stuff in Java if you want to interact with the Android framework
- Loading classes is supported by LibDalvikHook
 - `dexstuff_loaddex()`
 - `dexstuff_defineclass()`


Loading Classes 1/3

- Load DEX file into DVM
- Define classes, tell DVM what classes to load from DEX file
 - Get class loader...

```
args[0].l = "PATH/classes.dex"; // must be a string object
cookie = dvm_dalvik_system_DexFile[0](args, &pResult);

// get class loader
Method *m = dvmGetCurrentJNIMethod();
// define class
u4 args[] = {
    "org.mulliner.collin.work", // class name (string object)
    m->clazz->classLoader,      // class loader
    cookie                       // use DEX file loaded above
};
dvm_dalvik_system_DexFile[3](args, &pResult);
```


Loading Classes 2/3



Loading Classes 3/3

- The loaded classes can be used like any other class
 - Using C-JNI or Java code
- Each class has to be defined (incl. all inner classes), yes really!
 - e.g. `org.mulliner.collin.work$really`
- Dalvik cache at: `/data/dalvik-cache`
 - Needs to be made world writable
 - Required for class loader to write **odex** file
 - **odex** file needs to be deleted on class update
 - `rm /data/dalvik-cache/data@local@tmp@classes.dex`

Instrumentation Code Flow (v2)



Interacting with the Target Application

- Our (java) code runs inside the target process, yay!
 - But how do we interact with it?

- Access target's objects (class instances)
 - Scrape them from method parameters

```
int somemethod(Intent x, CustomClass y)
```

- Access the Application Context (android.content.Context)
 - Interact with the Android framework: send Intents, ... (next slides)

Field Scraping 1/2

- Access fields (class variables)
 - Manipulate and/or extract data
- Steps
 - Acquire class object (e.g. thru method hook)
 - Know the field name and type (source or disassembly of target class)
 - Access field (JNI GetXField)

```
 jobject some_method(JNIEnv *env, jobject obj, ...)
 {
     cls = FindClass(env, "org/mulliner/collin/work");
     fid = GetFieldID(env, cls, "fieldname",
                     "Landroid/content/Context;");
     jobject = GetObjectField(env, obj, fid);
 }
```

Field Scraping 2/2 (for java nerds)

- Inner vs. outer Class
 - Sometimes you will have access to wired stuff but not the stuff you are looking for
 - e.g access to some inner class (ending with \$Name) you want the outer class or some member of it
- Java generates synthetic member variables for you
 - Inner class has access to the outer class via `this$0`

```
org.mulliner.collin.work & org.mulliner.collin.work$harder
```

Access only to object of type \$harder

```
FindClass(env, "org/mulliner/collin/work$harder");  
GetFieldID(env, cls, "this$0", "Lorg/mulliner/collin/work");
```

Access to Application Context

- Scrape fields of type: Service, Application, ...
 - Say hi to your disassembler :)
- Use the ActivityThread
 - Usable from any UI thread

```
Class<?> activityThreadClass =  
    Class.forName("android.App.ActivityThread");  
  
Method method =  
    activityThreadClass.getMethod("currentApplication");  
  
Application app =  
    (Application) method.invoke(null, (Object[])null);
```

Rapid Prototyping of Framework Modifications

- Defense against SMS OTP stealing Trojans [1]
 - Change local SMS routing based on SMS content
- For the prototype we needed to change code in the framework

```
com/android/internal/telephony/SMSDispatcher.java  
protected void dispatchPdu(byte[] pdu) { ... }
```

- Instead of recompiling Android just replace the method
 - save a lot of time
 - test on many different devices without custom compile

[1] *SMS-based One-Time Passwords: Attacks and Defense (short paper)* Collin Mulliner, Ravishankar Borgaonkar, Patrick Stewin, Jean-Pierre Seifert
In the Proceedings of the 10th Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment
(DIMVA 2013) Berlin, Germany, July 2013

Using DVM internal functions, for profit

- Dump list of loaded classes in current VM
 - Useful to find out which system process runs a specific framework service

```
dvmDumpAllClasses(level);  
// level 0 = only class names 1 = class details
```

- Dump details of specific class
 - All methods (incl. signature), fields, etc...


```
cls = dvmFindLoadedClass("Lorg/mulliner/collin/work");  
dvmDumpClass(cls, 1);
```

DvmDumpClass output for java.lang.String

```
I/dalvikvm( 410): ----- class 'Ljava/lang/String;' cl=0x0 ser=0x50000016 -----
I/dalvikvm( 410):   objectSize=24 (8 from super)
I/dalvikvm( 410):   access=0x0003.0011
I/dalvikvm( 410):   super='Ljava/lang/Object;' (cl=0x0)
I/dalvikvm( 410):   interfaces (3):
I/dalvikvm( 410):     0: Ljava/io/Serializable; (cl=0x0)
I/dalvikvm( 410):     1: Ljava/lang/Comparable; (cl=0x0)
I/dalvikvm( 410):     2: Ljava/lang/CharSequence; (cl=0x0)
I/dalvikvm( 410):   vtable (62 entries, 11 in super):
I/dalvikvm( 410):     17: 0x56afd4e8           compareTo (Ljava/lang/String;)I
I/dalvikvm( 410):     18: 0x56afd520   compareToIgnoreCase (Ljava/lang/String;)I
I/dalvikvm( 410):     19: 0x56afd558           concat (Ljava/lang/String;)...
I/dalvikvm( 410):     20: 0x56afd590           contains (Ljava/lang/CharSequ...
I/dalvikvm( 410):     21: 0x56afd5c8           contentEquals (Ljava/lang/CharSequ...
. . . .
I/dalvikvm( 410):   static fields (4 entries):
I/dalvikvm( 410):     0:           ASCII [C
I/dalvikvm( 410):     1: CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER Ljava/util/Comparator;
I/dalvikvm( 410):     2:     REPLACEMENT_CHAR C
I/dalvikvm( 410):     3:     serialVersionUID J
I/dalvikvm( 410):   instance fields (4 entries):
I/dalvikvm( 410):     0:           value [C
I/dalvikvm( 410):     1:           hashCode I
I/dalvikvm( 410):     2:           offset I
```

Modifying Stuff Globally

- **zygote** is base VM for all processes
 - Code injected into zygote propagates to all newly created processes
- **system_server** handles like everything
 - monitor and/or cross process Intents



Getting Serious!


- We can...
 - inject native + Dalvik code into any Android process
 - hook Dalvik methods in Apps, the Framework, and Java core libraries
 - Interact with the Apps and the Android framework
- We did...
 - spy on behavior of Apps API calls
 - changed SMS handling in the Android framework
- **Lets attack real stuff and make some \$\$\$\$**

Android In-App Billing

- Sell stuff from within an Android application
 - Upgrade to full version
 - Remove advertisement
 - In-game coins
 - Arbitrary content
- Google takes 30% of all sales
 - Google says they make significant revenue with this



In-App Billing: Overview




Attacking In-App Billing 1/2

- Goals
 - Unlock full versions, free content, in-game coins :-)
- Previous attacks (according to a friend)
 - **Manually patching**
 - The Apps
 - Remove checks, disable billing code, ...
 - the Android Market App
- Problems
 - A lot of work and testing, needs to be for each App
 - Repeat after every update :-)
 - Fucking up your Market App

Attacking In-App Billing 2/2

- Use Dynamic Dalvik Instrumentation (DDI)
- Implement once run anywhere
 - Start / Stop attack on-demand
- No need to manually do anything on per-app basis
- Updates don't bother us
 - (Market API changes do)

The Attack



Disable security.
This is a signature
check. **Remember
signature.verify?**
Done in zygote, this
is global!

Instrument
Market App
→ only the In-
App billing API

Good use of backend makes
this hard again

Dog and Pony Show (Demo)

- ...a video

Conclusions

- Dynamic Instrumentation via the Android Runtime allows
 - Modification of Apps and the Framework in memory
 - Doesn't break APK signatures
 - Portable across devices
 - Super stable (not a hack)
 - But can only replace whole functions
 - no bytecode modification
- Possible to stir up Android AppSec quite a bit
 - Obfuscation and use of reflection is kinda useless
- We have various ongoing projects based on this
 - Students doing interesting stuff

DDI Framework Release!

- DDI Framework released in source, of course!
 - Injection tool + libs
 - Including examples
 - No source for GooglePlay attack!
- <http://www.mulliner.org/android/ddi/>
 - Repo will be on GitHub



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EOF

Thank you!

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<http://mulliner.org/android>
<http://seclab.ccs.neu.edu>

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The Dalvik VM - libdvm

- We interrogate the DVM using dlsym()
 - We just need a small number of symbols

```
// hooking
dvmFindLoadedClass
dvmFindVirtualMethodHierByDescriptor
dvmFindDirectMethodByDescriptor
dvmUseJNIBridge
// class loading
dvm_dalvik_system_DexFile
dvmStringFromCStr
dvmGetSystemClassLoader
dvmGetCurrentJNIMethod
// debugging :)
dvmDumpAllClasses
dvmDumpClass
```