NAME

crypt, **crypt_r**, **crypt_rn**, **crypt_ra**, **crypt_gensalt**, **crypt_gensalt_rn**, **crypt_gensalt_ra** − password hashing

SYNOPSIS

#define _XOPEN_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>

char *crypt(const char ***key*, const char ***setting***);**

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <crypt.h>

char *crypt_r(const char ***key*, const char ***setting***, struct crypt_data ***data***);**

#define _OW_SOURCE
#include <crypt.h>

char *crypt_rn(const char ***key*, const char ***setting***, void ***data***, int** *size***);**
char *crypt_ra(const char ***key*, const char ***setting***, void ****data***, int ***size***);**
char *crypt_gensalt(const char ***prefix*, unsigned long** *count***, const char ***input***, int** *size***);**
char *crypt_gensalt_rn(const char ***prefix*, unsigned long** *count***, const char ***input***, int** *size***, char ***output***, int** *output_size***);**
char *crypt_gensalt_ra(const char ***prefix*, unsigned long** *count***, const char ***input***, int** *size***);**

DESCRIPTION

The **crypt**, **crypt_r**, **crypt_rn**, and **crypt_ra** functions calculate a cryptographic hash function of *key* with one of a number of supported methods as requested with *setting*, which is also used to pass a salt and possibly other parameters to the chosen method. The hashing methods are explained below.

Unlike **crypt**, the functions **crypt_r**, **crypt_rn** and **crypt_ra** are reentrant. They place their result and possibly their private data in a *data* area of *size* bytes as passed to them by an application and/or in memory they allocate dynamically. Some hashing algorithms may use the data area to cache precomputed intermediate values across calls. Thus, applications must properly initialize the data area before its first use. **crypt_r** requires that only *data->initialized* be reset to zero; **crypt_rn** and **crypt_ra** require that either the entire data area is zeroed or, in the case of **crypt_ra**, **data* is NULL. When called with a NULL **data* or insufficient **size* for the requested hashing algorithm, **crypt_ra** uses **realloc**(3) to allocate the required amount of memory dynamically. Thus, **crypt_ra** has the additional requirement that **data*, when non-NULL, must point to an area allocated either with a previous call to **crypt_ra** or with a **malloc**(3) family call. The memory allocated by **crypt_ra** should be freed with **free**(3).

The **crypt_gensalt**, **crypt_gensalt_rn**, and **crypt_gensalt_ra** functions compile a string for use as *setting* − with the given *prefix* (used to choose a hashing method), the iteration *count* (if supported by the chosen method) and up to *size* cryptographically random *input* bytes for use as the actual salt. If *count* is 0, a low default will be picked. The random bytes may be obtained from **/dev/urandom**. Unlike **crypt_gensalt**, the functions **crypt_gensalt_rn** and **crypt_gensalt_ra** are reentrant. **crypt_gensalt_rn** places its result in the *output* buffer of *output_size* bytes. **crypt_gensalt_ra** allocates memory for its result dynamically. The memory should be freed with **free**(3).

RETURN VALUE

Upon successful completion, the functions **crypt**, **crypt_r**, **crypt_rn**, and **crypt_ra** return a pointer to a string containing the setting that was actually used and a printable encoding of the hash function value. The entire string is directly usable as *setting* with other calls to **crypt**, **crypt_r**, **crypt_rn**, and **crypt_ra** and as *prefix* with calls to **crypt_gensalt**, **crypt_gensalt_rn**, and **crypt_gensalt_ra**.

The behavior of **crypt** on errors isn't well standardized. Some implementations simply can't fail (unless the process dies, in which case they obviously can't return), others return NULL or a fixed string. Most implementations don't set *errno*, but some do. SUSv2 specifies only returning NULL and setting *errno* as a valid behavior, and defines only one possible error (**ENOSYS**, "The functionality is not supported on this implementation.") Unfortunately, most existing applications aren't prepared to handle NULL returns from **crypt**. The description below corresponds to this implementation of **crypt** and **crypt_r** only, and to **crypt_rn** and **crypt_ra**. The behavior may change to match standards, other implementations or existing applications.

crypt and **crypt_r** may only fail (and return) when passed an invalid or unsupported *setting*, in which case they return a pointer to a magic string that is shorter than 13 characters and is guaranteed to differ from *setting*. This behavior is safe for older applications which assume that **crypt** can't fail, when both setting new passwords and authenticating against existing password hashes. **crypt_rn** and **crypt_ra** return NULL to indicate failure. All four functions set *errno* when they fail.

The functions **crypt_gensalt**, **crypt_gensalt_rn**, and **crypt_gensalt_ra** return a pointer to the compiled string for *setting*, or NULL on error in which case *errno* is set.

ERRORS

EINVAL

crypt, **crypt_r**, **crypt_rn**, **crypt_ra**: *setting* is invalid or not supported by this implementation;

crypt_gensalt, **crypt_gensalt_rn**, **crypt_gensalt_ra**: *prefix* is invalid or not supported by this implementation; *count* is invalid for the requested *prefix*; the input *size* is insufficient for the smallest valid salt with the requested *prefix*; *input* is NULL.

ERANGE

crypt_rn: the provided data area *size* is insufficient for the requested hashing algorithm;

crypt_gensalt_rn: *output_size* is too small to hold the compiled *setting* string.

ENOMEM

crypt (original glibc only): failed to allocate memory for the output buffer (which subsequent calls would re-use);

crypt_ra: **data* is NULL or **size* is insufficient for the requested hashing algorithm and **realloc**(3) failed;

crypt_gensalt_ra: failed to allocate memory for the compiled *setting* string.

ENOSYS

crypt (SUSv2): the functionality is not supported on this implementation;

crypt, **crypt_r** (glibc 2.0 to 2.0.1 only): the crypt add-on is not compiled in and *setting* requests something other than the MD5-based algorithm.

EOPNOTSUPP

crypt, **crypt_r** (glibc 2.0.2 to 2.1.3 only): the crypt add-on is not compiled in and *setting* requests something other than the MD5-based algorithm.

HASHING METHODS

The implemented hashing methods are intended specifically for processing user passwords for storage and authentication; they are at best inefficient for most other purposes.

It is important to understand that password hashing is not a replacement for strong passwords. It is always possible for an attacker with access to password hashes to try guessing candidate passwords against the hashes. There're, however, certain properties a password hashing method may have which make these key search attacks somewhat harder.

All of the hashing methods use salts such that the same *key* may produce many possible hashes. Proper use of salts may defeat a number of attacks, including:

1. The ability to try candidate passwords against multiple hashes at the price of one.

2. The use of pre-hashed lists of candidate passwords.

3. The ability to determine whether two users (or two accounts of one user) have the same or different passwords without actually having to guess one of the passwords.

The key search attacks depend on computing hashes of large numbers of candidate passwords. Thus, the computational cost of a good password hashing method must be high − but of course not too high to render it impractical.

All hashing methods implemented within the **crypt**, **crypt_r**, **crypt_rn**, and **crypt_ra** interfaces use multiple iterations of an underlying cryptographic primitive specifically in order to increase the cost of trying a candidate password. Unfortunately, due to hardware improvements, the hashing methods which have a fixed cost become increasingly less secure over time.

In addition to salts, modern password hashing methods accept a variable iteration *count*. This makes it possible to adapt their cost to the hardware improvements while still maintaining compatibility.

The following hashing methods are or may be implemented within the described interfaces:

Traditional DES-based

This method is supported by almost all implementations of **crypt**. Unfortunately, it no longer offers adequate security because of its many limitations. Thus, it should not be used for new passwords unless you absolutely have to be able to migrate the password hashes to other systems.

prefix "" (empty string);
a string matching ^[./0-9A-Za-z]{2} (see **regex**(7))

Encoding syntax
[./0-9A-Za-z]{13}

Maximum password length
8 (uses 7-bit characters)

Effective key size
up to 56 bits

Hash size
64 bits

Salt size
12 bits

Iteration count
25

Extended BSDI-style DES-based

This method is used on BSDI and is also available on at least NetBSD, OpenBSD, and FreeBSD due to the use of David Burren's FreeSec library.

prefix "_"

Encoding syntax
_[./0-9A-Za-z]{19}

Maximum password length
unlimited (uses 7-bit characters)

Effective key size
up to 56 bits

Hash size
64 bits

Salt size
24 bits

Iteration count
1 to 2**24-1 (must be odd)

FreeBSD-style MD5-based

This is Poul-Henning Kamp's MD5-based password hashing method originally developed for FreeBSD. It is currently supported on many free Unix-like systems, on Solaris 10, and it is a part of the official glibc. Its main disadvantage is the fixed iteration count, which is already too low for the currently available hardware.

prefix "1"

Encoding syntax
\$1\$[^$]{1,8}\$[./0-9A-Za-z]{22}

Maximum password length
unlimited (uses 8-bit characters)

Effective key size
limited by the hash size only

Hash size
128 bits

Salt size
6 to 48 bits

Iteration count
1000

OpenBSD-style Blowfish-based (bcrypt)

bcrypt was originally developed by Niels Provos and David Mazieres for OpenBSD and is also supported on recent versions of FreeBSD and NetBSD, on Solaris 10, and on several GNU/*/Linux distributions. It is, however, not a part of the official glibc.

While both **bcrypt** and the BSDI-style DES-based hashing offer a variable iteration count, **bcrypt** may scale to even faster hardware, doesn't allow for certain optimizations specific to password cracking only, doesn't have the effective key size limitation, and uses 8-bit characters in passwords.

prefix "$2a$"

Encoding syntax
\$2a\$[0-9]{2}\$[./A-Za-z0-9]{53}

Maximum password length
72 (uses 8-bit characters)

Effective key size
limited by the hash size only

Hash size
184 bits

Salt size
128 bits

Iteration count
2**4 to 2**99 (current implementations are limited to 2**31 iterations)

With **bcrypt**, the *count* passed to **crypt_gensalt**, **crypt_gensalt_rn**, and **crypt_gensalt_ra** is the base-2 logarithm of the actual iteration count.

PORTABILITY NOTES

Programs using any of these functions on a glibc 2.x system must be linked against **libcrypt**. However, many Unix-like operating systems and older versions of the GNU C Library include the **crypt** function in **libc**.

The **crypt_r**, **crypt_rn**, **crypt_ra**, **crypt_gensalt**, **crypt_gensalt_rn**, and **crypt_gensalt_ra** functions are very non-portable.

The set of supported hashing methods is implementation-dependent.

CONFORMING TO

The **crypt** function conforms to SVID, X/OPEN, and is available on BSD 4.3. The strings returned by **crypt** are not required to be portable among conformant systems.

crypt_r is a GNU extension. There's also a **crypt_r** function on HP-UX and MKS Toolkit, but the prototypes and semantics differ.

crypt_gensalt is an Openwall extension. There's also a **crypt_gensalt** function on Solaris 10, but the prototypes and semantics differ.

crypt_rn, **crypt_ra**, **crypt_gensalt_rn**, and **crypt_gensalt_ra** are Openwall extensions.

HISTORY

A rotor-based **crypt** function appeared in Version 6 AT&T UNIX. The "traditional" **crypt** first appeared in Version 7 AT&T UNIX.

The **crypt_r** function was introduced during glibc 2.0 development.

BUGS

The return values of **crypt** and **crypt_gensalt** point to static buffers that are overwritten by subsequent calls. These functions are not thread-safe. (**crypt** on recent versions of Solaris uses thread-specific data and actually is thread-safe.)

The strings returned by certain other implementations of **crypt** on error may be stored in read-only locations or only initialized once, which makes it unsafe to always attempt to zero out the buffer normally pointed to by the **crypt** return value as it would otherwise be preferable for security reasons. The problem could be avoided with the use of **crypt_r**, **crypt_rn**, or **crypt_ra** where the application has full control over output buffers of these functions (and often over some of their private data as well). Unfortunately, the functions aren't (yet?) available on platforms where **crypt** has this undesired property.

Applications using the thread-safe **crypt_r** need to allocate address space for the large (over 128 KB) *struct crypt_data* structure. Each thread needs a separate instance of the structure. The **crypt_r** interface makes it impossible to implement a hashing algorithm which would need to keep an even larger amount of private data, without breaking binary compatibility. **crypt_ra** allows for dynamically increasing the allocation size as required by the hashing algorithm that is actually used. Unfortunately, **crypt_ra** is even more non-portable than **crypt_r**.

Multi-threaded applications or library functions which are meant to be thread-safe should use **crypt_gensalt_rn** or **crypt_gensalt_ra** rather than **crypt_gensalt**.

SEE ALSO

login(1), **passwd**(1), **crypto**(3), **encrypt**(3), **free**(3), **getpass**(3), **getpwent**(3), **malloc**(3), **realloc**(3), **shadow**(3), **passwd**(5), **shadow**(5), **regex**(7), **pam**(8)

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